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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
llUANE ROYLANCE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs. -
~TEPHEN L. DA VIES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No .. 
10641 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN ANSWER TO 
HESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
This brief is in response to the argument and author-
itips rdie<l upon by Respondent in his brief in support 
nt a P!'tition for Rehearing. 
R('spondent 's Petition states: 
"This Court, in its opinion, applied the rule 
that our guest statute released the operator of an 
automobile from responsibility for injuries to a 
gratuitous guest unless the operator intended tlw 
accident to occur." 
ln ~upport of this assertion, Respondent quotes excerpts 
(Int of context from the Court's opinion. 
2 
The Court did not so hold. Tl1e ma· ·t JOfl y npilllf))l 
reaffirms Stack v. Kearnes 118 Utah 237, 221 P. 2d 50! 
( 1950) and the test laid down by that decision in tJi1, 
following language : 
"Willful misconduct connotes a greatn 
wrongdoing than mere negligence or ewn gl'O~., 
negligence. It includes a conscious or intentioual 
violation of definite law or rule of conduct wilJ1 
the knowledge of the peril to be apprehended 
from such act or failure to act. 
• • • 
"The intentional doing of an act or intrntional 
omitting or failing to do an act, with knowlPdg1' 
that serious injury is a probable and not merely 
a possible result, or the intentional doing of ai; 
act with wanton and reckless disregard of the 
possible consequences. It involves deliberate in-
tentional or wanton conduct in doing or omitting 
to do an act with knowldege or appreciation th&t 
injury is likely to result therefrom." 
It was the holding of this Court in the instant case that 
under this test there was "no evidence of willful mis 
conduct in the record to sustain the verdict'' for the 
Respondent. 
Section 500(b) Restatement (Second), Torts cik1l 
by Respondent in no way detracts from and in fad 
supports the position of this Court in the presPnt ra~e. 
3 
R.Pspondent's authority in support of his Petition 
\'or HPhearing is primarily a special concurring opinion 
in 8 n OrPgon case and a section from a treatise dis-
rll~sing the theory and weaknesses of guest statutes. 
'J'he case of Burghardt v. Watson, 349 P.2d 792 (Ore., 
1~60) quoted by Respondent involved an action for per-
:nnal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when the de-
fendant driver's vehicle went out of control after round-
ing a curve in the highway. The Oregon court held 
that tliP evidence, including the driver's alleged violation 
of the speed limit, was insufficient to warrant a finding 
of gross negligence on the driver's part to allow recovery 
i!llder the guest statute. The court mentioned that there 
was nothing in the record to indicate ari"I don't care 
what happens attitude" which could transmute the de-
fendant's ordinary negligence, if any, into gross negli-
Respondent in his brief quotes the full text of Judge 
O'Connell's special concurring opinion except for the 
last paragraph which reads: 
"In my opinion, there was not sufficient evi-
dence in the present case from which the jury 
could justifiably conclude that defendant's con-
duct was reckless ·within the meaning of O.RS. 
:10J 10. Therefore, I concur." 
.Judge 0 'Connell pointed out that "the full conscious-
ness that a risk is to be encountered will not result in 
4 
reckless conduct if the probability of harm is ~light 
01 
if the probability is great but the harm wl1id1 11 i1r 
probably result is not serious." He statPd that t]i
1
, 
ingredient lacking in the Burglwrdt casp was a ]
1
j.,], 
.~' 
degree of probability that serious harm would n•:rnh 
Therefore, in spite of all the dirta, .Judge O'Connf'!: 
concurred in holding there was not suffieiPnt eyid1·nc·
1 
to reach even the level of .r1rnss 11e9ligencc and IYvrr.,,iJ 
as a matter of law the judgment in favor of tlw plaintilt 
In the second to last paragraph in his coneunin:; 
opinion, Judge O'Connell pointed out the position ()['a 
court with regard to the theory and application 1Jf a 
guest statute: 
"Perhaps the tim<::• has come whPn tlt(' jun 
should be permitted to treat automobile gnPct~ 
in the same mannPr as it treats otlwr injmP:! 
plaintiffs; but that changP must come from th1 
legislature, not from us." 
Five months aftf'r tlw Burphardt opm1on 11n' 
handed down, the Oregon Supreme Court \\'a,..; ap;ai11 
faced with the guest statutP in M cN a!Jb L Delm11w11. 3:i~ 
P. 2d 290 (Ore., 1960). That case has been set fortl1 
at page 16 of Appellant's original brief in this adi(Jn. 
The Oregon Supreme Court with Judge O'Connell joi11 
ing, held that the defendant's conduct did not awurnit 
to gross negligence stating among other things tluil 
"poor judgment viewed from hindsight is not enough t11 
constitute gross negligence." 
5 
Aftrr the lengthy theoretical discussion quoted by 
llc:;pomlcnt from Harper and Jam es on Torts, those 
authors conclude in the last paragraph of that portion 
quuted that : 
"When we come to consider the kind of show-
mg which courts will regard as sufficient to 
warrant a finding of liability under guest statutes, 
there is far greater uniformity than there is as 
to theory or proper language for instructions." 
CON CL l!SION 
'I'he opinion of the Court in this case is a correct 
awlication of Utah law and not a departure therefrom 
~'claimed by Respondent. An attack upon guest statutes 
rn goll~ral is insufficient to support a rehearing in this 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, 
SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
701 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Appellant 
